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Abstract 
In order to safely monitor and control autonomous vessels, it is essential for a Shore Control Centre 
(SCC) operator to achieve an adequate level of situational awareness (SA). To achieve this, an 
SCC interface must be created to support SA. However, there is a lack of empirical research on 
SA-supportive design for SCC interfaces, in addition to how many autonomous vessels an operator 
can monitor. To research this, an exploratory study was conducted with 13 participants, who were 
divided into three experimental groups and tasked to monitor a different number of vessels (1, 3 
or 6) in the first setup of MARIN's SCC. The participants completed four simulated scenarios, 
three of which contained deliberate incidents, to see if they could become adequately SA within 
the current system and if this would differ between experimental conditions. Quantitative measures 
such as perceived SA, perceived workload, reaction time, usability and performance (CPA) were 
collected, in addition to qualitative feedback from the participants. The results indicate that the 
current system fails to support SA for more than 1 vessel, as the participants in the 3 and 6 vessel 
condition had lower perceived SA and higher perceived workload than the 1 vessel condition. 
Qualitative feedback from the participants was collected and related to relevant literature to create 
user-centred recommendations for how to improve the interface SA support. An SCC interface 
built employing these recommendations should enhance safe monitoring and controlling of 
autonomous vessels through improved SA support. 
 
Introduction 
Autonomous vessels have the potential to revolutionize the maritime industry. Porathe, Prison and 
Man (2014) mention several potential benefits, such as cost reduction, reduction of emissions, 
more attractive work environment and increased safety. Creating an attractive work environment 
is important, as it is expected that recruitment of marine personnel to long haul voyages will 
become more difficult (Ottesen, 2014; Porathe et al., 2014). Cost reduction in the crew will not be 
high enough to justify autonomous vessels, but the modified design built for cargo and not humans 
makes it economically viable (Kretschmann et al., 2017). Further, Rolls Royce estimate 
autonomous vessels to reduce fuel costs and operation costs by 20% and 40% respectively 
(Mooney, 2015). In Norway, it has been suggested that autonomous vessels could relieve 
congested roads by transporting goods by sea (Rødseth, 2017) and be a more economical 
Enhancing operator situational awareness through enhanced design of Shore Control Centre interface 
2 
 
alternative to new, expensive bridges and tunnels (Rødseth, 2018). Wrobel et al. (2017) claim 
autonomous vessels would have caused fewer accidents in the past than manned vessels did.  
Autonomous vessels would likely not sail without human supervision, however. Instead, they will 
be monitored and/or controlled by human operators in SCCs (MacKinnon, Man and Baldauf, 
2015). The concept is quite new, and therefore there is only a handful of articles on the topic. In 
the final report by MUNIN (Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks), a 
joint European project to research autonomous vessels, they suggested that SCCs should be set up 
as a chain of centres around the world, distributing vessels amongst centres to only work in 
daylight hours (MacKinnon et al. 2015). As for the individual operator, MUNIN suggests that each 
operator would be responsible for 6 vessels (MacKinnon et al. 2015) so that 5 minutes is spent 
actively monitoring each ship, and then 30 minutes is spent passively monitoring all vessels (Man 
et al., 2018). However, the report does not elaborate on how this number of vessels or this 
monitoring strategy was tested or created, and the results are marked as inconclusive. 
Automation  
Although the idea of autonomous technology is to function independently, without external 
intervention, humans must usually still supervise it due to brittleness (Endsley, 2017). In this 
context, brittleness refers to automation not being able to solve situations it was not specifically 
designed to solve (Woods & Cook, 2006). Therefore, human operators would monitor the 
automation, and intervene if the automation could not handle a specific situation. However, while 
humans have the cognitive skills to solve these situations, they only have limited abilities when it 
comes to monitoring. When it comes to attentive limitations, Mackworth (1950) had participants 
monitor a clock which would skip a second on random intervals, and the participants had to make 
a note of every time it happened. He found that the participants were only able to monitor it for 30 
minutes before performance decreased drastically.  
One of the greatest problems with human monitoring of automation is over-reliance and 
complacency. Multiple authors have theorized that humans put too much faith in automation (e.g. 
Wiener and Curry, 1980; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; May, 1999; Endsley, 2017). Because 
automation seems to perform perfectly, humans do not feel the need to closely monitor it. 
Therefore, when errors do occur in automation, human operators tend not to notice it (Endsley, 
2017). Further, Endsley (2017) says that when automation is correct, people are more likely to 
Enhancing operator situational awareness through enhanced design of Shore Control Centre interface 
3 
 
make a correct decision, however, when it is incorrect, people do worse than they would do without 
any advice at all. This was empirically supported by Skitka, Mosier, and Burdick (1999), who 
compared an automated and a non-automated flight task. They trained the participants not to trust 
the decision aid 100%, yet the participants in the automated condition committed over-reliance 
errors when the automation failed, and in total performed worse than the non-automation 
condition. In a different study by Riley (1994), plane pilots experienced this automation bias to a 
higher degree than student participants, even though the experimental task was not related to 
aviation. This suggests that experience does not decrease automation bias, but rather increases 
susceptibility (Riley, 1994). May, Molloy and Parasuraman (1993) found that detection of 
automation failure varies inversely with automation reliability, which was validated by Oakley, 
Mouloua & Hancock (2003) using more levels of reliability. This effect has also been empirically 
validated in a maritime context by Pazouki, Forbes, Norman and Woodward (2018). In their small-
sample study (n=12), all but one participant who did not receive specific training failed to 
recognise a failure in the automation which was not announced by an alarm. Pazouki et al. (2018) 
believe this to be due to ineffective monitoring and over-reliance.  
As MacKinnon et al. (2015) wrote in the MUNIN report on SCCs, SCC operators must “be able 
to quickly identify operational abnormalities, unexpected threats and errors quickly and efficiently 
in a highly automated context”. However, due to the mentioned automation-complacency, 
operators’ risks falling “out of the loop” (OOTL). This challenge is referred to as the “automation 
conundrum” (Endsley, 2017). With operators being OOTL, they are slow to realize that their 
intervention is required, and when they do intervene, their performance is reduced (Endsley, 2017). 
Endsley and Kris (1995a) found that OOTL issues are caused by a loss of SA in the operator.  
SA 
The casual definition of SA is "knowing what’s going on" (Endsley, 1995a), but Endsley (1995a) 
also defines SA more formally as "the perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status 
in the near future". The Endsley model (Endsley, 1995a) describe SA as states, divided into three 
different levels: perception (level 1), comprehension (level 2) and projection (level 3). Perception 
is the most basic level, with activities like monitoring and simple recognition. This process 
depends largely on working memory and long-term memory, selectively guiding limited 
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attentional resources towards the most relevant areas, by knowing which areas should be 
prioritized (Endsley, 2001; Johannsdottir & Herdman, 2010). The second level, comprehension, 
goes beyond simple awareness of environmental elements, to understand the significance of these 
perceived elements. The third level, projection, is the ability to project future actions based on 
these elements. The processes in level 2 and 3 rely on working memory, with the operator 
combining new information with existing knowledge (Endsley, 1999; Endsley, 2001). The 
importance of SA in a maritime context has also been tested empirically by Cordon, Mestre and 
Walliser (2016). They performed a factor analysis on a large list of words connected to seafaring, 
which they had marine officers rate depending on how important they were to do a good job as a 
marine officer. The analysis revealed underlying factors very similar to the Endsley SA model.  
SA is the primary way to measure the effectiveness of an interface system in an SCC (see 
MacKinnon et al., 2015; Endsley, 2017; Ramos et al., 2019). To explain the SA model in an SCC 
context, an ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information System, an electronic sea map) will 
be used as an example. To reach level 1 SA, the operator needs to perceive, recognise and monitor 
the different elements on their ECDIS. To reach level 2, the operator must fully comprehend what 
these elements mean (i.e. the dots on my ECIDS represent real-life vessels in a specific area). To 
reach level 3, the operator must understand how these elements can project a future situation, for 
instance, an emergency situation where the operator must intervene (i.e. a traffic vessel is crossing 
my route from starboard, I should monitor the situation to make sure that my autonomous vessel 
gives way).  
There are several important factors that cause loss of SA (Endsley, 2017), like cognitive 
engagement, complexity and workload. Endsley (2017) notes that it is inherently challenging to 
make an operator stay cognitively engaged in a task when they are not actively participating in the 
task. Further, SA is negatively affected by increased system complexity, as it reduces the system 
predictability since it is difficult for the operator to make an accurate mental model of how the 
system works (Endsley, 2017).  
Not only is SA affected negatively by task complexity, but also by display complexity (Endsley, 
2017). Often interfaces for automated systems do not provide sufficiently salient information about 
the state of automation nor does it provide much feedback about the state of the system (i.e. system 
assessment, ability to handle the current/upcoming situation) it controls (Endsley, 2017). This low 
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level of transparency can make it difficult to comprehend the system and project future actions. 
Endsley (2017) notes that this can be a challenge for a designer, as removing unnecessary 
information is often needed to highlight information the designer regards as important, but this 
may also cause other important information to be removed by accident. Automation that gathers 
and present information (level 1 SA), and then integrates that into the specific context to help 
comprehension and projection (level 2 and 3 of SA) enhance SA (Endsley, 2017). However, 
making information too salient, or automating an information-filtering system to help the operator 
find important information can significantly degrade SA, as the operator could lose overview over 
the full situation (Endsley, 2017). If these challenges are solved adequately, Endsley (2017) 
believes that SA in an automation context can be significantly improved. As Endsley said in 
(2001): "Success will go to the developers who understand how to combine and present the vast 
amounts of data now available from the many technological systems present in order to provide 
true situation awareness". 
The informational presentation also affects workload. While onboard crew would have received 
sensorial information from the ship, giving them “ship sense” (Prison, Dahlman & Lundh, 2013), 
an SCC operator must gain their SA through information on a screen. If too much information is 
perceived, the operator will not have enough attentional capacity to pay enough attention to each 
of them and will suffer from “informational overload” (Galbraith, 1974). This refers to a task 
having information-processing requirements that exceed the capacity of the individual (Galbraith, 
1974), and has been recognised as a problem in human-computer interaction for a long time (Jones 
& Kelley, 2018). Informational overload increases the general cognitive workload for an operator, 
which in turn decreases SA (Endsley, 1999). In SA terms, this occurs when the operator is not able 
to fully perceive all information on their displays, and therefore not able to fully comprehend nor 
project future actions. A simple solution could be to drastically reduce the information presented 
to the operator on the displays. However, this must be done with care, as the operator still needs 
to have enough information to achieve adequate SA. With too little information, the operator 
cannot fully comprehend the situation of the vessel, thus making the operator unavailable to project 
future actions. Further, too little information would cause cognitive underload, in which attentional 
resources decrease to adjust for reduced demand for attention (Young & Stanton, 2002). This may 
even be a bigger concern than cognitive overload, as it too decreases performance, but it is harder 
to detect (Young & Stanton, 2002).  
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SCCs 
There is little knowledge of the informational requirements of an SCC. In the only known study 
on this topic, Porathe et al. (2014) interviewed 6 bridge officers with the intention of finding the 
most important information that is needed to gain situational awareness in an SCC. They came up 
with 165 pieces of information, split into 9 different categories: voyage plan, sailing, observations, 
safety and emergencies, safety, cargo, technical, shore control centre and administrative. However, 
these suggested informational requirements have not yet been empirically researched and 
implementing all 165 pieces of information could potentially evoke informational overload.  
To develop a system which integrates this information in an optimized way, it is crucial to use a 
human-centred design approach. According to Billings (1997), through human-centred 
automation, one can ensure that the human operator is able to monitor a system, that they receive 
sufficient feedback and that the automation works in a predictable way, so that high levels of 
performance can be reached, and which would support SA. Human-centred design has been an 
essential principle in developing the new interface software for the Dutch Coastguard (A. Steevels, 
M. Pattipawaej, personal communication, May 9th, 2019). Furthermore, according to ECDIS 
developer M. F. Sørensen, the lack of human-centred design was what caused the first generations 
of ECDIS to be so complex and hard to use that they were practically useless (M. F. Sørensen, 
personal communication, May 13th, 2019). 
To address all these mentioned challenges, the design of an SCC interface is therefore of utmost 
importance. Various authors within various fields of automation, also some specifically working 
with SCCs, believe that SA issues with autonomous interfaces can be resolved partly or fully 
through improved design (Arrabito, 2010; Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010; Westrenen & Praetorius, 
2014; Ottesen, 2014; Endsley, 2017; Pazouki et al. 2018; Man et al., 2018).  
However, there has been little research about SAs implication on interface design for SCCs (Man 
et al., 2018). Such research is of high importance, as an SCC cannot simply copy the design of the 
bridge of a ship. This was tested by Man et al. (2015), but it was not effective. Instead, Man et al. 
(2015) notes, SCCs has to be designed specifically to support the operators need to develop SA. 
Man et al. (2018) also underline the importance of ecological design when creating SCCs, taking 
into account both the environmental changes related to an SCC, as well as cognitive limitations.  
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The scope of this study is to evaluate MARINs first version of an SCC interface by measuring how 
well it supports SA, workload, performance and usability. Thus, this study aims to answer the main 
research question R1: 
• R1: What information should be presented to an SCC operator in an optimal SCC interface, 
and how should this information be presented, so that the interface is usable and supports 
the creation of SA, ensuring the operator's ability to safely monitor and control an 
autonomous vessel, in this specific operational context? 
By answering the sub-research questions R2, R3 and R4: 
• R2: Conceptualising SA as perceived SA (measured with self-report questionnaires) and 
objective SA (measured with eye-tracking), to what degree are the participants able to 
become situationally aware with the current interface? 
• R3: Considering their navigational performance and which feedback they gave concerning 
informational requirements; which parts of the interface need to be changed to enhance 
situational awareness and performance? 
• R4: How does the number of vessels to monitor and control affect the operator’s 
performance, workload, and situational awareness? 
The hypothesis for the main research questions is:  
• H1: The necessary information for the latter will be; heading, RPM, position, course over 
ground, rate of turn, speed over ground, planned route, mode information, engine/rudder 
status, a security parameter and a cargo parameter, as well as weather information.  
And the hypotheses for sub-research questions are: 
• H2: The participants will experience low levels of perceived SA, have low levels of relevant 
fixations and high entropies, as the system does not currently support SA sufficiently. 
• H3: Most parts of the interface must be changed to some degree to enhance SA and 
performance, as a user-centred design is necessary to achieve high levels of SA and 
performance. 
• H4: The operator will perform better and be more SA when monitoring fewer vessels, as 
fewer vessels should produce less workload, and low workload is associated with high SA. 
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Method 
Design 
This exploratory study employed a between-subjects, mixed-methods design. The independent 
variables are the number of vessels the participants monitored (1, 3 or 6) and purposefully caused 
incidents in the scenarios. The distance at the start time of incident between the incident vessel and 
the autonomous vessel was measured as a covariate. The conditions were counterbalanced by 
randomizing scenario 2, 3 and 4, to avoid learning effects. Scenario 1 was not randomized, as it 
was important to have this as the first scenario, to build trust in the automation, which as previously 
mentioned affects SA and OOTL problems through automation-complacency (Parasuraman & 
Riley 1997; Endsley 2017). The dependent variables are SA (measured by eye-tracking reaction 
time and SART inspired questionnaire items), perceived workload (adjusted NASA-TLX, Hart & 
Staveland, n.d.), usability (measured by SUS scale, Brooke, 1996) and performance (measured by 
CPA).  
Participants 
The study was conducted with 13 male participants with a mean age of 43.3 years (range 21-72, 
SD = 18.04), thus including younger participants than what previous studies have done (Man et al. 
2015; 2018). The participants were eligible for the study if they had some experience with maritime 
navigation and were; maritime students (graduated/nearly-graduated) (n=3), prior mariners (n=3), 
current mariners (n=3), prior mariners experienced with MARIN simulator software (n=2) or 
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) personnel (n=2). The inclusion criteria were purposely broad to 
capture the entire spectrum of possible future SCC operators, including both experienced and 
novice seafarers. This was important in order to design for the relevant end-users, in accordance 
with user-centred design principles.  The recruitment was conducted with opportunity sampling 
through MARINs and the researcher's contact network. All student and some prior mariners were 
recruited by contacting the following Dutch maritime institutes: Maritiem Instituut Willem 
Barentsz, Hogeschool of Amsterdam and Hogeschool of Rotterdam. The participants with VTS 
background were recruited from the VTS at Port of Rotterdam. All current and some prior mariners 
were recruited from the semi-autonomous vessel Windea de la Cour. The prior mariners with 
Dolphin experience were recruited internally within MARIN. In accordance with MARINs 
internal guidelines for participant compensation, students were compensated with 150 euros and 
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professionals with 500 euros. The study was ethically approved by the ethics committee of Leiden 
University, Institute for Psychological Research. The study was conducted in accordance with 
GDPR rules concerning privacy and storage of data.  
Procedure 
Before the day of their participation, each participant received a written briefing (appendix A) to 
understand the basic principles about SCCs, autonomous vessels and the task of SCC operators. 
On the day of the experiment, the participant completed the informed consent form (Appendix B), 
which informed about the general nature of the study, anonymisation of the data, the measurements 
which would be taken and the participant's possibility to withdraw at any moment without 
consequences. The participant also completed a questionnaire collecting demographic details 
(Appendix C), as well as completing a questionnaire measuring their attitudes to automation 
(appendix D). The participant was then theoretically briefed for 30 minutes to explain the topics 
mentioned in the written briefing more in-depth, as well as explaining the general idea of the 
interface. Finally, the participant was given 20 minutes for practical familiarization with the SCC 
setup. The instructions were identical between the experimental conditions.  
The study was conducted in MARINs facilities in Wageningen, in a room dedicated to SCC 
simulation. A maximum of two participants was done per today to ensure a reliable quality of the 
experiment. The duration of the full experiment (including briefings and breaks) was 5 hours for 
one participant and 7 hours for two participants. The same interviewer conducted both the 
interviews and experiment observation, to ensure there was no inter-experimenter variability. 
During the debriefing (Appendix H) the participants were explained more thoroughly the specific 
objectives of the study, how automation had been simulated and how to contact the experimenters 
in case of questions or discomfort due to having been part of the experiment. 
Tasks 
The participants acted as SCC operators and were tasked to monitor autonomous vessels and 
intervene when necessary. The participant did 4 sessions of 30 minutes, during which the 
participant was exposed to an incident in scenario 2, 3 and 4. The deliberate incidents involved 
violations of COLREGS, a vessel suddenly appearing on their electronic sea chart and a rudder 
failure. The full details of each incident can be found in Appendix I. The participants were 
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responsible for medium-sized shipping vessels, sailing outside the coast of the Netherlands and 
Barcelona. The routes for the maritime simulation was created with inspiration from real-life 
maritime tracking from marinetraffic.com (pictures in Appendix J). Experimental conditions were 
randomized within the occupational group to ensure that experimental conditions were equally 
distributed among groups. The order of scenarios was randomized between all participants. All 
randomization was done using Randomizer.org (Urbaniak & Plous, 2013).  
Each scenario was created to measure the SA level of the participant in two general situations; 
with or without an incident occurring. As previously mentioned, the biggest challenge for SCC 
operators is to stay SA (MacKinnon et al., 2015; Ramos et al, 2019), mainly due to OOTL 
problems (Endsley & Kiris, 1995). By exposing them to scenarios with low levels of stimuli for 
prolonged periods of time, they were hypothesised to become OOTL, thus lowering their SA. The 
scenarios would, therefore, measure their ability to quickly regain SA to efficiently solve the 
incidents. Furthermore, the workload was measured as it is an important part of SA, and especially 
relevant for the last research question, being the part of SA hypothesized to cause a difference 
between the experimental conditions. All tasks were created specifically for this study, in 
cooperation with maritime experts at MARIN, to ensure validity and feasibility.  
Apparatus  
An SCC simulator was developed based on the existing MARIN simulation software “Dolphin”. 
The final set-up consisted of five displays. Three of the displays are traditional maritime features: 
an ECDIS display, a RADAR display and a conning display. An ECDIS plots the position of the 
operator’s vessel and nearby traffic on a maritime chart, the RADAR plots any object of sufficient 
size in close proximity and the conning display informs of vessels navigational information (i.e. 
speed, heading, rate of turn, weather). The other two, the vessel status display and the manual 
control window, are specific for an SCC. The vessel status display was supposed to inform of the 
health status of the vessel(s) based on Porathe et al. (2014) suggested informational requirements, 
in addition to the mode of automation. However, due to technical difficulties, it could only change 
colour to indicate a general error, which the participant had to locate specifically themselves. The 
manual control window let the participant change from autonomous to manual control, by selecting 
either waypoint (autonomous, track following), course (custom course and speed) or “manual 
command” (direct, remote control with virtual telegraph, rudder and bowtrusther). The inspiration 
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for the SCC setup came from MUNINs suggested setup from 2015 (Rødseth & Baumeister), as it 
was considered to be a good presentation of the necessary information to become situationally 
aware. However, MUNIN did not elaborate on how the interface was created, nor how it was 
tested. Therefore, part of this study is exploring empirically how well an SCC inspired by their 
interface works. The MUNIN setup was chosen as it seemed to provide sufficient information to 
become aware of the external conditions through ECDIS and RADAR, and internal conditions 
through the conning and the vessel status display. This information was hypothesized to support 
higher levels of SA, supporting the participant comprehending their own vessel and its 
environment (SA level 2) and thus enable projection of future states (SA level 3), which is 
important in an autonomous interface (Endsley, 2017). The system also supports low level of SA 
(level 1) by presenting the functions and information in the interface in an intuitive manner. The 
alarms in the SCC setup was kept to a minimum, with no audible alarms or pop-up notifications. 
This was done to prevent the operator from relying too much on alarms and thus relying too much 
on the system, as this could make the operator too complacent, lowering SA and performance due 
to automation bias (Parsasuraman & Riley, 1997). The full set-up is available in Appendix K. The 
full experiment was tested with 1 pilot tester. Based on the experience from this pre-testing, errors 
in routes and interface were corrected before the participants took part in the experiment. 
Measures 
Demographical information, appendix C: Collected the following data: Age, nationality, current 
and prior maritime occupations, previous experience with maritime navigation, previous 
experience with maritime simulators, previous experience with MARIN software.  It took an 
average of 5 minutes to complete. 
Attitudes to automation (quantitative measure), appendix D: A questionnaire was created to 
measure attitude towards maritime automation, as this could have had caused cognitive overhead 
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997) and confound performance. The questionnaire was inspired by the 
Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 1989), and took an average of 5 minutes to complete. 
Eye-tracking: Eye-tracking was measured with the intention of providing an objective 
measurement of perceived SA, as SAGAT had been found too intrusive past studies at MARIN. 
Further, stopping a participant doing a task and asking them about awareness could have artificially 
increased their awareness.  
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Post-scenario questionnaire (quantitative measure), appendix E: After each scenario, the 
participant completed a questionnaire measuring perceived workload, SA and usability. Perceived 
workload (items 1-6) was measured using the entire NASA-TLX questionnaire, which was 
measured due to its relation with SA (Endsley, 1999) and to possibly further explain differences 
between experimental conditions. Perceived SA (7-10) was measured using relevant items from 
the SART (Selcon & Taylor, 1990), leaving out workload items. Usability (items 11-12) was 
measured to look for differences between scenarios. It took 5 minutes to complete on average. 
Post-interview (qualitative measure), appendix G: A semi-structured interview was conducted to 
measure participants overall perceived SA, perceived workload, perceived usability and perceived 
realism of scenarios. Items 1-6 were inspired by the SART (going more into depth than post-
scenario questionnaire), item 7 was created to gain feedback on the realism of scenarios (inspired 
by Man et al., 2018), items 8-10 and 13 measured overall perceived usability, and items 11-12 
measured overall perceived workload. The interview took 30 minutes on average. 
SUS usability questionnaire (quantitative measure), appendix F: The SUS measures the perceived 
usability. The major advantage of using SUS for this study is that it produces a global score which 
can be compared to a global benchmark (Lewis, 2018), which was especially useful due to the lack 
of control group/baseline. The questions were answered on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The questionnaire was presented in English, but with Dutch 
translation present, created by a native Dutch speaker at MARIN who used the questionnaire in 
his work (van den Oever, 2019). It took 5 minutes on average to complete.  
Performance (quantitative measure): Performance was measured by CPA (closest point of 
approach), which indicates the closets point a vessel will be to approach another vessel. The 
measure is given in nautical miles to the incident vessel and was automatically computed by the 
simulation software.  CPA is a common performance measure in a maritime context, which would 
usually be supplemented by a subjective expert rating, however, there are no SCC operator experts 
yet. Therefore, the measure was simplified to be that a higher CPA indicated safer sailing. 
Analysis   
The participants were split into three experimental condition; monitoring 1 (n=4), 3 (n=4) or 6 
(n=5) autonomous vessels. This was important to gain an understanding of how the number of 
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vessels affects perceived SA and perceived workload, thus indicating how the current interface is 
able to support safe monitoring and control of several vessels. Two recordings of eye-tracking data 
disappeared while transferring files to the computer with the eye-tracking software. Although an 
effort was made to retrieve the missing files, this was unsuccessful. The analysis where this could 
have had an affected makes a mention of this. Due to the small sample size and purposefully high 
variability in participants, there were several outliers. However, as none of these were due to 
measurement error, and likely reflected the true performance or opinion of the participant in 
question, these outliers were not removed. This made the analysis more difficult but removing or 
changing the outliers could have caused artificial results. The raw eye-tracking data was analysed 
in Imotion/Tobii software.  
Attitude to maritime automation analysis  
The questions were answered on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A 
higher score indicated a more positive attitude to automation.  
Post-scenario questionnaire analysis  
For workload, lower scores indicate lower perceived workload. For SA, lower scores indicate 
higher perceived SA. For reaction time, higher scores indicate higher reaction time.  
SA eye-tracking analysis 
Fixations on relevant Areas of Interest (AOIs) and entropy would have been used to calculate SA 
level 1 and 3, respectively, based on research by Moore & Gugerty (2010) and Merwe et al. (2012). 
However, due to low variability in fixations, a lack of a unified SCC operator performance measure 
and not being able to extract scanpath from the eye-tracking software, this was not possible to 
calculate. As reaction time has been found to be a possible measure of SA (Endsley, Sollenberger 
& Stein, 2000), it was therefore used as the replacement measure for “objective” SA.  
SUS questionnaire analysis   
A score was calculated for each participant by subtracting 1 from the score of each odd number 
items, subtracting the value of the even-numbered items from 5, and multiplying the total score 
with 2.5 (Brooke, 1996). Then, a global average for all participants was calculated. Total scores 
can range from 0 to 100. The industry average is 68, but the industry standard is 80 (Lewis, 2018). 
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Qualitative data analysis  
The qualitative data was assessed inspired by grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Grounded 
theory is a qualitative research approach where you do not start with specific theory, but instead 
develop it based on the data whilst analysing it (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In this context, this was 
done by taking notes of common themes of suggestions and actions between participants and 
between groups and creating a “theory” of what an ideal SCC would need to contain.  
Performance analysis  
CPA is a continuous measure which was correlated with other relevant continuous variables. 
Because the participants could freely change their routes, the scenarios had to be dynamically 
adjusted in some cases in scenario 2 and 3. This caused some differences in the starting position 
between the incident vessel and autonomous vessel between participants, however, this was taken 
into account in all relations calculated with the CPA, using either partial correlations or ANCOVA. 
Results 
To test R2, regarding adequate level of SA, perceived SA and reaction time was compared to 
perceived workload, performance and perceived performance between the scenario and the 
experimental conditions. To test R3, regarding the usability of the system, the global SUS score 
was compared to perceived SA, qualitative data was collected and compared to reaction times. To 
test R4, about differences between monitoring a different number of vessels, differences in means 
between experimental conditions were compared in perceived SA, perceived workload, 
performance and reaction time.  
Perceived SA and perceived workload 
The mean values and the SD’s for perceived SA and perceived workload are presented in table 1. 
The data met the assumption of normality using a Shapiro-Wilks test, p = .882 for workload and p 
= .531 for SA. The assumption for homogeneity was met using Levene's test, p = .298 for workload 
and p = .915 for SA. The assumption of independence was met for ANOVAs and correlations.  
 
Table 1: Mean and SDs, perceived SA and perceived workload, between experimental conditions 
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 Perceived SA Perceived workload 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
1 vessel 1.82 .40 1.80 .46 
3 vessels 2.55 .45 2.58 .54 
6 vessels 2.61 .41 2.66 .26 
 
To see if there was a general relation between perceived SA and perceived workload, a correlation 
was conducted. A very strong, significant, positive correlation was found, r = .937, p < 0.001. This 
indicates that as workload increase, situational awareness decreases (a higher score means lower 
perceived SA).  
To see if perceived SA and perceived workload differed between scenarios, a repeated-measures 
ANOVA was carried out. Mauchly’s W test did not indicate sphericity violation in either test, p = 
.755 for workload and p = .543 for SA respectively, and therefore sphericity was assumed. The 
difference in perceived workload was not significant F(3, 36) = .856, p = .473, however, for SA a 
significant difference was observed F(3, 36) = 3.648, p = .021, η2 = .233. The LSD posthoc test 
indicated that perceived SA was significantly higher in scenario 1 compared to scenario 3, p = 
.007, and 4, p = .01. As presented in figure 1, this suggests that the participants perceived SA was 
significantly higher in the non-incident scenario (1) than in two of the incident scenarios 3 and 4. 
Figure 1: Number of fixations on each display, between scenarios. 
 
To see if there was a relation between the number of monitored vessels, the perceived SA and 
perceived workload, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. A significant main effect difference was 
observed for perceived SA, F(2,10) = 4.480, p=.041, η2 = .473, and for perceived workload, 
F(2,10) = 5.270, p = .027, η2 = .513. The posthoc test indicated a significant difference between 1 
and 6 vessels for both perceived SA, p = .048, and perceived workload, p = .038. This suggests 
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that when a participant monitors more than 1 vessel, perceived SA decreases, and perceived 
workload increases. 
Objective SA 
The mean reaction time was the highest for scenario 3 (65.44 seconds), followed by scenario 4 
(54.85 seconds) and 2 (16.13 seconds), which is presented in Table 2. The data met the assumption 
of normality using a Shapiro-Wilks test, p = .338, the assumption for homogeneity using Levene's 
test, p = .843, and the assumption of independence.  
Table 2: Mean reaction time to incidents, between scenarios 
 Mean SD 
Scenario 2 16.13 24.06 
Scenario 3 65.44 45.32 
Scenario 4 54.85 76.25 
 
To see if the number of vessels monitored affected the reaction time of the participant, a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted between reaction time and experimental condition. However, there was 
no statistically significant differences, F(2, 11) = .918, p = .434. This comparison could have been 
affected by the missing recording mentioned previously, which in this case affected the 6-vessel 
condition, resulting in all conditions having 4 participants. The mean values and SD’s between 
experimental conditions are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Mean reaction time to incidents, between experimental conditions 
 Mean SD 
1 vessel 36.94 20.89 
3 vessels 24.55 28.88 
6 vessels 51.64 33.65 
 
Performance  
The means and SDs for the CPA are presented in table 4. The data met the assumptions for 
normality with a Shapiro-Wilk test, p = .812, homogeneity with a Levene's test, p = .645, and 
independence. All correlations met the assumption of homoscedasticity and linearity. 
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Table 4: Mean and SDs for CPA, between experimental conditions and scenarios  
 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
1 vessel .50 .35 .11 .09 .29 .08 
3 vessels .69 .39 .03 .05 .72 .39 
6 vessels .58 .29 .02 .03 .35 .16 
To see if performance was affected by the number of vessels monitored, a one-way ANCOVA was 
conducted with CPA and the experimental condition, with start distance in scenario 2 and 3 as 
covariates. No statistically significant differences were found, F(2, 12) = 1.873, p = .220, however, 
an inverted U-trend was observed. The highest CPA in the 3 vessel condition, while the 1 and 6 
vessel condition had almost identical overall means.  
Several correlations were performed to see how SA was related to performance, both perceived 
and objectively. To measure perceived performance, item 4 of the workload scale was included, 
as this item asked the participants to rate their own performance. This data met the assumption of 
normality with a Shapiro-Wilk test, p = .925, and independence.  
To see if objective performance related to objective SA, a partial correlation was performed 
between CPA and reaction time, with start distance in scenario 3 as a control variable. This was 
done specifically for scenario 3, as reaction time had no impact on CPA in scenario 2 and 4. It 
revealed a significant, strong, negative correlation, r = -.817, p = .025, which indicates that lower 
reaction times was related to a higher CPA in scenario 3.  
Then, a correlation was performed between perceived performance and perceived SA. A strong, 
significant, positive correlation was observed, r = .614, p = .025. Lastly, a partial correlation was 
performed between CPA and perceived SA, with start distance in scenario 3 as a control variable, 
to see if objective performance related to perceived SA. However, there was no significant 
correlation, r = .332, p = .365. This indicates that when perceiving themselves to be more SA, the 
participants perceived themselves to perform better, but this did not relate to performing better 
objectively. The correlations and partial correlations are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Correlations between perceived SA, reaction time, CPA and perceived performance  
 CPA  Perceived performance 
Perceived SA .332 .614* 
Reaction time -.667* .094 
* = Correlation is significant at 0.05 level. ** = Correlation is significant at 0.01 level. 
Usability  
After completing all four scenarios, the participants completed the SUS usability questionnaire 
(Brooke, 1996). The global score of all participants was 68.65 (range 52.5 - 95, SD = 11.7), which 
is just above the industry average of 68, although well below the industry standard of 80 (Lewis, 
2018). The data had met the assumption of normality with a Shapiro-Wilks test, p = .296, linearity 
and homoscedasticity. 
To see if usability was perceived differently between experimental conditions, a one-way ANOVA 
was performed, however, no significant differences were observed, F(2,10) = .127, p = .882.  
To see if the perception of SA related to the perception of usability, a correlation was performed 
between perceived SA and the SUS score. A strong, significant, negative correlation was found, 
r= -.566, p=.044, indicating that as the perceived level of usability increases, the level of perceived 
SA increases as well.  
Qualitative data 
To investigate how to improve the usability of the system, qualitative feedback was collected 
during the sessions, after the sessions and during the post-interview. Following is a summary of 
the qualitative data.  
Autonomy specific  
Specific to the autonomy, two main issues were raised; the mode of automation is unclear and 
there is no feedback on the next action.  
Currently, the only way to check the mode of automation of a vessel (autonomous/manual) is to 
check each vessel individually in the control window. This was mentioned by several participants 
to be too cumbersome, mostly by participants controlling more than one vessel. Three participants 
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had a vessel go off track as they forgot/did not realize they were in manual mode, two of which 
grounded their vessel (not related to a planned incident). 
Another issue, mentioned by all participants, was “when is the vessel going to act, and what is it 
planning on doing?”. They had been informed that the vessel would act to keep a safety distance 
of 1 nautical mile to other vessels. However, the participant did not know if the autonomous vessel 
had seen the other vessel and therefore spent time to monitor if the vessel actually would take 
action. This was mentioned particularly often in scenario 2, where an autonomous vessel 
approaches a manned vessel head-on. In this scenario, only two participants waited long enough 
to let the autonomous vessel act, while the rest took manual control earlier.  
Prompts 
In addition to the vessel status display with colour-coded notifications, the participants also wanted 
other types of prompts. A close-distance prompt was suggested by 4 participants. They imagined 
this to be a prompt integrated into the vessel status display which gave a prompt if another vessel 
came too close to one of the autonomous vessels. The specifics of this they did not agree on, 
however. One participant (monitoring 6 vessels) suggesting a prompt for any vessel with a CPA 
of less than 3 nm, while another (monitoring 1 vessel) suggested a safety distance of 0.25 nm. 
Participant 7 (monitoring 6 vessels) suggested a notification if an operator had not monitored a 
specific autonomous vessel for a specific amount of time. During the experiments, it was 
noticeable that all participants who monitored more than 1 vessel, for some period of the 
experiment focused too much on a particular vessel. The consequence was that many vessels were 
left without supervision leading to many groundings/collisions, particularly in scenario 3.  
Lastly, a suggestion was made for a prompt appearing if a vessel goes heavily off course, without 
being under the active supervision of an operator. The idea was that this would make errors in the 
vessels track-following capacities apparent at an early stage.   
Display marking  
Only some participants suggested enhancing the marking of the displays, however, several 
participants seemed to be affected by this, particularly for the RADAR and the conning. Currently, 
only the control window is labelled with which autonomous vessels is currently selected. They 
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would like this information to also be available in the RADAR, conning and vessel status display, 
as well as more salient marking in the controlled display.  
Physical changes 
Three participants would like an increased size of the ECDIS, and one would like an increased size 
of RADAR display. One of the participants suggested keeping the ECDIS the way it is but having 
a large separate ECDIS display. This, they said, would enable the operator to have some overview 
of all vessels, but still, focus on one particular vessel of interest.  
Furthermore, four participants mentioned the placement of the vessel status display, which was 
placed in the bottom-right corner of the monitor on the left. When the vessel status display turned 
red in scenario 4, most participants reacted late, as they did not notice the change. According to 
them, it was out of their line of sight, and they only noticed something was wrong by checking the 
RADAR or the ECDIS. This related well with their eye-tracking recordings. 
Functionality 
Six participants, distributed among all experimental conditions, asked to be able to control the 
speed of an autonomous vessel, without taking it off route mode. This is currently not available. 
Such a semi-autonomous feature allows them to control the speed, while not having to spend so 
much time monitoring the heading of a vessel, they said. On two occasions, participants used 
manual control to reduce the speed of a vessel, left the vessel momentarily to monitor other vessels, 
and when they came back, the manually controlled vessel had grounded. Both occurred in scenario 
1 (non-incident), in the 6-vessel condition.  
Currently, when selecting a specific vessel through the vessel status display, only the RADAR and 
the conning changes, while the controlled display did not. This inconsistency caused confusion, as 
some participants forgot to change the controlled display, and ended up taking control of the wrong 
vessel, causing at least one grounding. This was mentioned as a problem by 7 participants, almost 
all of which monitored more than 1 vessel. As one of the participants said: “One-click should 
change all of them, so you don’t forget.” 
Another frequent mention was CPA information. While only four participants mentioned it 
explicitly, all participants seemed to find it cumbersome to use, as accessing the CPA information 
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required a total of 8 clicks. As participant 5 said, “You want this to be available with a single 
click”. One participant “solved” this issue by covering his ECDIS-screen with multiple CPA 
screens, but he was only monitoring 1 vessel, and even then, it took up quite a lot of his screen. 
Some participants would also like a list of nearby vessels with basic information like the vessels 
name, speed, heading, ROT and destination. The information is available in the current interface 
but requires the operator to click manually on each vessel he would like information from. The 
information was suggested either to be shown on the ECDIS itself, or on the RADAR with ARPA.  
When asked in the post-interview if they would like a live visual feed, 6 participants said yes, 5 
participants said maybe, and 3 participants said no. The yes-side mentioned benefits like double-
checking their displays the same way they use windows in manned vessels. The maybe-side said 
that it is only useful when going into port or looking at a vessel close up. The no-side thought it 
would just add additional workload to check another display, without giving much-added value.   
When asked in the post-interview if any of the information they were provided with was not useful, 
8 said no. Of the remaining five, 2 found the latitude/longitude presented with the CPA information 
not useful, 1 said the conning on the control window, 1 mentioned the conning in general and 1 
mentioned the vessel status display.  
ECDIS and RADAR 
There were quite a lot of suggestions specifically for the ECDIS and the RADAR, some quite 
detailed. For the ECDIS, four participants said it was too hard to distinguish one autonomous 
vessel and its route from the other vessels and routes. They suggest solving this by colouring each 
autonomous vessel and corresponding route in a different colour than the other autonomous 
vessels. One participant also suggested representing the vessels by triangles, so that the operator 
would instantly know which direction they were going. Further, seven participants would like clear 
marking on the ECDIS which vessel was currently selected. The participants would like the 
currently selected vessel to either increase in size (participant 2 and 7), centring the ECDIS on this 
vessel (participant 3 and 10) or have the label constantly showing (participant 7). As for more 
detail-level suggestions, two participants would like past waypoints/route to disappear to have a 
cleaner ECDIS, and one suggested presenting the scale of the ECDIS.  
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Concerning the RADAR, participants mainly proposed quite detailed changes and would like the 
following features to be included: CPA, targets, ARPA, bow-crossing time, bearing points and 
parallel lines. One participant also mentioned that setting a range for the RADAR for specific 
vessels would be helpful, as this varies greatly for vessels in open sea, confined waters and port.  
Six participants would like either partial or full RADAR integration on ECDIS. This relates well 
with the post-interview, where participants were asked about which information was particularly 
useful in the interface, and 11 mentioned a RADAR or an ECDIS feature. 7 mentioned a RADAR 
features (vectors, bearings/range or the whole RADAR) and 8 answered an ECDIS feature (CPA, 
predictions, AIS, waypoints, measuring lines). Therefore, integrating the two most perceived most 
useful features would make sense. 
Due to issues with recording lengths, which affected the total amount of fixations, statistical tests 
could not be carried out to check for significant differences. However, descriptive statistics for the 
distribution of fixations on displays indicate that ECDIS was fixated on the majority of the time, 
with a mean of 70% between experimental conditions and between scenarios. Any clear difference 
between the RADAR and the other displays is not visible in either, however.  
Figure 2: Fixations between scenarios.          Figure 3: Fixations between number of vessels.  
 
Feasible number of vessels to monitor 
When asked explicitly in the post-interview to name a feasible number of autonomous vessels an 
SCC operator could monitor and control safely, the answers varied greatly, ranging from to 2 to 
more than 10. The modal number was 4 but only mentioned by 3 participants.  
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Discussion 
The main research question for this study was: What information should be presented to an SCC 
operator in an optimal SCC interface, and how should this information be presented, so that the 
interface is usable and supports the creation of SA, ensuring the operator's ability to safely monitor 
and control an autonomous vessel, in this specific operational context?  
This was split into three sub-research questions, which will be discussed separately. 
• R2: Conceptualising SA as perceived SA (measured with self-report questionnaires) and 
objective SA (measured with eye-tracking), to what degree are the participants able to 
become situationally aware with the current interface? 
The hypothesis was that the operators would experience low levels of perceived SA and low levels 
of objective SA, as the system would not support SA sufficiently.  
Perceived SA was found to increase as the perceived workload increased, in accordance with 
previous findings (Endsley, 1999), thus serving as basic form of validation that the selected SART-
inspired items did, in fact, measure a construct similar to perceived SA. Perceived SA also related 
to perceived performance but did not correlate with the objective performance measure (CPA). 
This is in accordance with previous studies, which has found perceived SA to relate with perceived 
performance, but not their objective SA (Xu et al., 2018). Instead, perceived SA seems to be a 
separate construct (Salmon et al., 2009). While this construct should not be underestimated, as a 
system without perceived SA would make an operator feel uncomfortable, it does not necessarily 
indicate objective SA. A correlation was however found between reaction time and CPA, 
indicating that the objective SA was associated with the objective performance. In other words, 
while the SA participants perceived to have had little to with their objective performance, their 
objective SA did relate to their objective performance.  
However, when comparing perceived SA between scenarios, a significant difference was found, 
with perceived SA being significantly higher in the non-incident scenario 1 than in two of the 
incident-scenarios, 3 and 4.  This pattern follows the general, though non-significant pattern, of 
the objective SA. In scenario 2, the mean reaction time was low, which was likely due to the 
potential incident being observed by participants right from the start of the scenario, as well as 
being the slowest incident to unfold. Scenario 3, which required the fastest intervention to avoid 
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incident had the highest mean reaction time, explaining why most participants experienced 
groundings/collisions in this scenario. This scenario tested if participants would notice and manage 
to take action with an incident that happened suddenly due to failure in the automation. As 
previously cited, MacKinnon wrote: “SCC operators must be able to quickly identify unexpected 
threats and errors quickly and efficiently”. However, while that is the goal, the result of this study 
is in accordance with previous studies (Pazouki et al., 2018), in which only 1 out of 12 participants 
recognised a failure in automation without receiving specific training. Pazouki et al. (2018) believe 
the error is due to ineffective monitoring and over-reliance. This over-reliance likely causes an 
OOTL situation, which reduces SA, which in turn delays and reduces the quality of performance 
of the operator (Endsley, 2017). Scenario 4 was used to test the alarm functionality in the vessel 
status display, by turning on a red light to indicate technical failure. The idea of the alarm was to 
inform the operator straight away that something is wrong. However, the high mean reaction time 
indicates that this was not successful. The alarm was made less salient on purpose to avoid 
automation bias, however, this result indicates that the alarm was not salient enough to support 
enhanced SA of the situation. Further, the high variability indicates that the system is not reliable 
enough between participants.  
Thus, the participants perceived themselves to have a SA which match their self-perceived 
performance, but this did not relate to their objective performance. Between scenarios, the 
participants perceived their SA to be lower during the non-incident scenario than in incident 
scenarios 3 and 4. Similarly, for objective SA, the reaction time in scenario 3 was generally so 
high that the simulated incident could not be avoided, and so high in scenario 4 that the alarm 
functionality in the vessel status display did not support enhanced SA. Therefore, during the 
incidents nor the participants perceived SA nor their objective SA was sufficiently supported by 
the current interface, and thus adequate SA was not achieved.  
R3: Considering their navigational performance and which feedback they gave concerning 
informational requirements; which parts of the interface need to be changed to enhance situational 
awareness and performance? 
The hypothesis was that since the first version of the system was not developed with a user-centred 
approach, most parts of the interface would have to be changed to enhance SA and performance. 
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The global SUS score seems to support the potential for improvement. The system achieved a 
score of 68.65, which is just above the industry average but well below the industry standard. 
Further, the SUS score strongly correlated with perceived SA. This indicates a potential for 
improving perceived SA by improving perceived usability. That would also be in line with the 
authors which believe that problems concerning SA could be solved through better interface design 
(see Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010; Endsley, 2017; Pazouki et al. 2018; Man et al., 2018).  
To investigate further the specific parts of the interface which should be changed, qualitative data 
was collected from the participants, in line with a human-centred design approach (Billings, 1997). 
Related to the autonomy itself, the participants mentioned two main issues; unclear mode of 
automation and lack of feedback of the next action. Clear mode of automation and high system 
transparency are both features regarded as highly important in an interface for an autonomous 
system according to Endsley (2017). Specifically, for an SCC interface, mode of automation could 
be highlighted in a larger, salient position on the vessel status display, and feedback on next action 
could be given as simple text information about next planned action(s).  
For prompts, the current system only has a simple prompt-system that works by giving a colour-
coded message to indicate internal failure. This was somewhat due to limitations on the complexity 
of the simulator system which was used, but also to not make the operators dependent on these 
prompts, as this could increase autonomation bias. However, several of the prompts requested by 
the participants seems reasonable. A close-distance prompt would likely increase reaction time in 
incidents like scenario 3, thus increasing the creation of rapid SA, and a prompt for a vessel going 
heavily off course would be a good fail-safe for track-mode failures. One participant (monitoring 
6 vessels) suggested being prompted if a vessel had not been monitored for a specific amount of 
time. In general, building an interface to support the tasks of the operator is positive, and could 
reduce workload, as well as help the operator stay aware of the possible future incidents (SA level 
3). However, all of these must constantly be evaluated with the trade-off of increased possibility 
for automation bias (i.e. if the prompt does not work, the operator might perform poorly without 
it). This forms part of the automation conundrum, with more robust automation causing more 
complacency (Endsley, 2017). 
Several of the suggestions made and problems faced by the participant related to the same issue; a 
confusion about which ship they were operating. Inspired by classic automation term “mode 
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confusion”, used to describe confusion about mode of automation, it seems appropriate to name 
this “ship confusion”. 
Regarding functionality, the internal inconsistency when switching screens (RADAR and ECDIS 
switching with vessel status display, but conning did not), was an issue most participants 
experienced. This was an example of where poor usability leads to lowered situational awareness 
comprehension (level 2), as this lack of comprehension led to ship confusion on several occasions. 
Another usability issue was the lack of saliency for CPA information. This feature frequently used 
by all participants and cited by many participants as the most important piece of information in the 
interface. This feature was important for participants to gain awareness of the relative positions of 
the traffic vessels to the autonomous vessel, thus supporting SA level 2 (comprehension) and level 
3 (projection). Instead of the 8 clicks which are currently required to present this information, it 
should have a salient place in the SCC interface, for instance forming part of the conning display 
or an integrated ECDIS/RADAR. The participants did not agree about whether to include a visual 
feed. It is a technical issue, as it is a lot of data to transmit without delay, but it is also a 
psychological issue, as it could increase operator awareness, but they could also become dependent 
and become very vulnerable to technical failure. This trade-off should be subject to further research 
to see if the added value of a visual feed outweighs the risks. 
For the ECDIS, one of the suggestions was to colour waypoints to make it clearer which belonged 
to which vessel. Such a feature was found to be the most useful added feature in a study on UAV 
interfaces (Fuchs, 2014). One participant also suggested representing the vessels with triangles, to 
clearly indicate which way vessels are going. Both these suggestions seem likely to increase SA, 
as it would facilitate quick recognition of the situation (level 1 SA), which in turn should support 
comprehension and projection of the situation (SA level 2 and 3).  
When asked about the most important information in the current interface, the ECDIS and/or 
RADAR was mentioned by almost all participants. However, looking at the descriptive statistics 
for share of fixations, the ECDIS was indeed fixated on heavily, but the RADAR did not seem 
more fixated than any other display. Since the RADAR was subjectively regarded as important, 
but not highly fixated on, it could indicate that the RADAR was not saliently enough placed, which 
was also mentioned by a few participants. The RADAR was placed on the left monitor, meaning 
the participant had to turn their head to see it. The other display on this monitor, the vessel status 
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display, was the least fixated display of all, even in scenario 4 which tested this display specifically. 
Therefore, one could argue that the RADAR was, in fact, fixated on quite frequently considering 
the placement.  
Thus, most parts of the interface need to be changed to increase usability and thus enhance SA and 
performance. The vessel status display and RADAR need to be placed more saliently, and the 
following features need to be integrated into the current interface: clear mode of automation, 
feedback on next action, additional prompts and more consistent screen functionality. All the 
suggestions relate well to Endsley’s (1995a) SA framework and to general HCI guidelines.  
• R4: How does the number of vessels to monitor and control affect the operator’s 
performance, workload and situational awareness? 
The hypothesis was that a higher number of vessels would increase the cognitive workload, thus 
decreasing situational awareness and performance, relative to a lower number of vessels.  
Both perceived SA and the perceived workload were found to be significantly different depending 
on the number of vessels an operator was responsible for. Both cases followed the same pattern. 
Once a participant had to monitor more than 1 vessel, SA decreased and workload increased, while 
there were no significant differences between monitoring 3 or 6 vessels.  
On one hand, this could indicate that monitoring more than one vessel simply is not feasible, as it 
increases perceived workload and decreases perceived SA. However, these results can also be 
interpreted to indicate that this is not feasible within the current system. In the latter case, 
performance could be increased by improving the usability of the system. That would align with 
comments made by some participants, which mentioned that they thought they could handle more 
vessels in an improved system. 
One potential issue with monitoring only one ship is boredom. Boredom is a danger to SA, with 
higher levels of boredom found to relate to slower reaction times (Thompson et al., 2006). 
Although not formally measured, the participants in the 1 vessel condition showed several signs 
of boredom which other participants did not, like tapping their fingers, whistling and taking phone 
calls. In this study, sessions were kept to a maximum of 30 minutes, which is the limit of a human’s 
ability to monitor monotonous stimuli according to Mackleworth (1950). Therefore, one could 
hypothesise that in a real-life setting, for the duration of a full working day, one vessel would 
Enhancing operator situational awareness through enhanced design of Shore Control Centre interface 
28 
 
become difficult to monitor simply because it is not stimulating enough to sustain the attention of 
the operator. This would align with comments made by participants, as four participants said they 
did not think they could do this for more than one hour and another participant said he could not 
do it for a full working day. This is not an issue on traditional manned vessels, as the operator in 
this context is actively steering the vessel, while in an SCC setting the participant is reduced to a 
passive observer, which should only intervene when necessary. As Endsley (2017) notes, it is 
inherently challenging to make an operator stay cognitively engaged in a task when they are not 
actively participating in the task. This could lead to cognitive underload, which as mentioned could 
be a bigger concern than cognitive overload, as it also decreases performance, but it is harder to 
detect (Young & Stanton, 2002). When asked explicitly about how many vessels one operator 
could safely monitor, the answers were very varied, but all were above one. In general, participants 
in the 1 vessel condition indicated a number between 2 and 4, participants with 3 vessels a number 
between 3 and 4, and participants with 6 vessels generally indicated lower numbers than 6. While 
all participants seem to believe they could monitor more than 1 vessel, they disagree on how many, 
indicating a general tendency for this study – an interface which does not support participants 
reliably, as many measures are riddled with outliers. 
Thus, the results indicate that perceived SA and perceived workload are better when monitoring 
one vessel. However, considering factors like boredom, cognitive underload and the subjective 
opinion of the participants, 1 vessel does not seem ideal either. Therefore, while the results meet 
the hypothesis, future research should be conducted to investigate if more than 1 vessel is feasible 
in an improved SCC interface.  
Significance, limitations and conclusion 
The findings in this study both have large significance for the research of SCCs, both theoretically 
and practically. Theoretically, this research supports that general theory about SA and automation 
are applicable also for SCCs. This means the maritime field can borrow knowledge from other 
fields, and thus do not need to “re-invent the wheel”. Furthermore, this study provides a blueprint 
for which psychological dimensions to include when researching SCC interfaces in an evidence-
based manner. Further, it also comments on the limitations of some measures, like using perceived 
SA to measure objective SA, and the challenges using eye-tracking to measure actual SA. 
Practically, this study provides specific recommendations, created with a user-centred approach, 
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for how to create an SCC interface that should support higher usability, and thus higher SA and 
performance than what the current system offers. These can be applied directly in any SCC 
interface and should be researched further.  
However, there are several limitations to this study. Although the sample is large compared to 
other SCC studies (Man et al., 2015; Man et al., 2018), the groups within the sample were small 
(range, 2-3), meaning that between-groups comparisons were not feasible. While participants in 
the prior/current mariner group were relatively easy to find, students and VTS personnel were not. 
However, this was positive for the quality of the qualitative feedback and the exploratory nature 
of this study, as it was given from a broader range of perspectives. Further, since objective SA 
could not be calculated, and perceived SA does not relate to objective performance measures, it 
reduces the study’s ability to comment on the level of objective SA in the participants. As for eye-
tracking, differences between fixations on different displays could not be statistically analysed 
calculated due to too high variability in eye-tracking recording length. Also, analysing eye-
tracking fixations within the ECDIS would also have given a more complex picture of participant 
behaviour but was not possible to analyse with the utilised eye-trackers and the eye-tracking 
software. Further, there was no inter-experimenter variability since once experimenter did all 
observations and analysis of the qualitative data. However, this also means that the presented 
summary of this data could have been subject to selection and phrasing bias of that experimenter. 
As for the simulation, although routes were inspired by real maritime traffic, the traffic density 
was judged to be too light by most participants, possibly reducing workload and making it easier 
to become SA. Lastly, while the participants did express increased trust in the interface as they 
completed more scenarios, most of them reported a continuous doubt in the autopilot as well as 
for our simulated collision-avoidance automation. Therefore, it is possible that they did not trust 
the system fully and became less complacent then they would have been with better automation, 
possibly causing higher SA and higher performance (Hogg and Gosh, 2016). 
Conceptually, the main issue is the lack of a unified performance measure. In other words, what 
constitutes good performance for an SCC operator? For traditional sailing, measures like CPA, 
rudder and telegraph control is normally combined with a subjective evaluation to create a 
performance measure. Therefore, CPA was included, but manual sailing is only part of an 
operator’s performance. The decision-making process about when to (not) intervene seems equally 
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important. Some participants almost tried to remote control all vessels, which is not the intention.  
This should be subject to a discussion in the maritime community, new IMO regulations and 
further research. This also relates to the second main question; how should an SCC operator be 
trained? For instance, should they be taught a specific monitoring pattern? With a standard training 
established, performance could be measured by how well the operator follows their training.  
Future research should empirically test the recommendations made in this study and verify if they 
do increase SA, performance and optimize workload. Once a sufficiently reliable system is created, 
this opens the possibility to look at an almost endless array of more specific research questions. 
How are these same variables affected by traffic density and weather? Further, when testing whole 
SCC teams, how can team SA be supported? Can vessels be transferred from one operator to 
another in case of an emergency? How much redundancy is necessary yet still cost-effective?  
To conclude, with the current system participants perceive their SA to match their perceived 
performance. However, the reaction times indicate that the system did not support sufficient 
objective SA, and the perceived SA decreased in incident scenarios. Separating by the number of 
vessels, the participants perceived themselves to be more SA and to have lower workload 
monitoring just one vessel. While this could indicate that it is only feasible to monitor this vessel, 
there is a risk of boredom and cognitive underload. Therefore, this study recommends future 
systems to be created for monitoring more than 1 vessel. However, for this to be feasible, the 
interface must support higher SA. This can be achieved through increasing the usability with the 
SA-supporting features such as: more salient placement of important features, a clearer mode of 
automation, feedback on next action, additional prompts and more consistent screen functionality. 
By employing these user-centred recommendations, which relates well to existing literature, a 
more SA-supportive interface can be created, thus increasing an operator’s ability to safely monitor 
and control autonomous vessels.   
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Appendix A – Briefing  
Shore Control Centre study briefing  
 
Dear participant,  
Thank you for deciding to participate in our study. To allow you to prepare for the tasks you will perform 
during the experiment, this briefing will give you some basic information about Shore Control Centres 
and your task as a participant. On the day of the experiment you will be briefed more in-depth and you 
will also have the opportunity to ask questions if something is unclear.  
What is a Shore Control Centre?  
A Shore Control Centre is where autonomous vessels will be monitored 
and/or controlled in the future by a Shore Control Operator. Ideally, an 
autonomous vessel should just control itself and sail independently, 
however, it is difficult to perfect the automation. Therefore, the ship 
could find itself in a situation it does not know how to solve and will need 
help from a human operator. In the future, these human operators will 
likely work in cooperation with other operators in a Shore Control Centre, 
but in this experiment we are only looking at one operator.  
Experimental context 
You will be tasked to act as the human operator in a Shore Control Centre. 
The autonomous vessels you are responsible for are sailing in a traffic 
situation with manned vessels, there are no other autonomous vessels besides the ones your 
supervising.   
You will be performing your task as an operator working for fictional SCC international. They work with 
shipping within Europe, with bases in the Netherlands and in Spain. The autonomous ships you will work 
with will be a medium-sized shipping vessel.  
The autonomous vessels will follow pre-determined routes. They have been set by the company, as they 
are regarded to be the most economical and efficient. The company policy is to stick to this route as 
much as possible.  
Your task as a Shore Control operator will be to continually monitor and control the autonomous vessels 
and to make sure that they get to their destination safely.   
To do so, you must follow the Shore Control operator decisions process. This consist of four main 
phases:  
1. Supervising safety status of the ship 
If a potential incident is observed: 
2. Assess the situation and decide on a strategy 
If deciding on a manual solution: 
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3. Executing the manual solution.  
After a solution (manual or autonomous) has been executed:  
4. Monitoring the situation and ensuring that the solution was successful. If successful, return to 
the first phase, if unsuccessful, return to the second phase.  
The Shore Control Centre interface  
The interface is built up by 5 displays. It contains an ECDIS display, a RADAR, a conning display, a vessel-
specific status display and an overview display. Some of these are probably familiar to you, and others 
not, but all of them will be described in further detail on the day of the experiment.  
Autonomous vessels 
If a traffic vessel is crossing the route of an autonomous ship, the autonomous ship is programmed to 
reduce speed substantially to ensure that the other ship can cross with a safe distance of margin.  
Context of study within MARIN 
Shore Control Centres is one of many subjects within MARINs larger research program on autonomous 
shipping. The larger objective is to create a full test bed for Shore Control Centre and autonomous 
shipping which can be used for training and simulations. The interface you will be using is the first 
version of MARINs Shore Control Centre. The objective of this specific study is to further enhance the 
user-friendliness of the interface, enabling the operator to monitor and control autonomous vessels in 
the safest possible manner.  
 
Appendix B – Informed consent form  
 
Titel van het onderzoek: Enhancing situational awareness through improved design of interfaces for operators in 
Shore Control Centres 
Verantwoordelijke onderzoeker: Lars Berntzen Arholm, Gerrit van der Want 
In te vullen door de deelnemer 
Ik verklaar op een voor mij duidelijke manier op de hoogte te zijn van de aard, methode, doel en [indien aanwezig] 
de risico's en de belasting van het onderzoek. 
Ik weet dat de gegevens en resultaten van het onderzoek alleen anoniem en vertrouwelijk zullen worden gebruikt 
en gepubliceerd. Mijn vragen zijn naar tevredenheid beantwoord. 
Ik begrijp dat eye-tracking, schermopnames en video-opnames alleen worden gebruikt voor analyse en / of 
presentatie van resultaten. 
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Ik stem vrijwillig in met deelname aan deze studie. Hoewel ik mij het recht voorbehoud om mijn deelname aan 
deze studie te beëindigen zonder opgaaf van reden. 
Naam deelnemer: …..………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Datum: ……………..…………… Handtekening deelnemer: ……………………………………………………  
In te vullen door de verantwoordelijke onderzoeker 
Ik heb een gesproken en geschreven uitleg gegeven van het onderzoek. Ik zal de resterende vragen over het 
onderzoek naar macht beantwoorden. De deelnemer zal geen nadelige gevolgen ondervinden in het geval van 
vroegtijdige beëindiging van deelname aan dit onderzoek. 
Naam onderzoeker: Lars Berntzen Arholm 
Datum: …………………….…… Handtekening onderzoeker:……….....…………………………………….. 
 
Appendix C – Demographics interview questions  
 
Demographical information 
 
Please fill in the following personal information:   
 
Age:  _______________       Gender:  _______________              Nationality: ______________ 
 
 
What is your (maritime) occupation? ___________________ 
 
 
 
Please answer the following questions about your experience:  
 
 
1. Have you been in a maritime simulator before? ❒  Yes ❒  No 
2. Have you been in a maritime simulator at MARIN before? ❒  Yes ❒  No 
3. Do you have experience using an ECDIS map? ❒  Yes ❒  No 
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4. Do you have experience using a RADAR? ❒  Yes ❒  No 
5. Do you have experience remote controlling a maritime vessel? ❒  Yes ❒  No 
6. Are you already familiar with the concept of Shore Control Centers?  ❒  Yes ❒  No 
7. How many years of experience do you have with maritime navigation?  _____________ 
 
Appendix D – Attitudes to automation questionnaire questions  
 
Please answer the following questions from the perspective of your current maritime experience and 
occupation, and how you think autonomous vessels will affect the maritime industry in general.  
1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Autonomous vessels would enable the maritime industry to accomplish 
tasks better   
     
2. Autonomous vessels would increase safety in the maritime industry      
3. It is worth sacrificing some traditional maritime jobs to achieve the 
potential benefits of autonomous vessels  
     
4. It would be easy to do long haul shipping with autonomous vessels       
5. It would be easy for the maritime industry to implement autonomous 
technology  
     
6. I would like to work in a Shore Control Centre in the future      
7. In general, autonomous vessels would have a positive influence on the 
maritime industry 
     
 
Appendix E – Post-scenario questionnaire  
 
Participant number:  
 Scenario number:  
1. How mentally demanding was this session?. 
1 2     3           4     5 
 
2. How physically demanding was this session?  
1 2      3           4     5 
 
Very low Very high 
Very low Very high 
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3. How rushed was the pace/speed of the session?  
1 2     3           4     5 
 
4. How successful were you in accomplishing what you 
had to do?  
1 2     3           4     5 
 
5. How hard did you have to work to achieve this level of 
performance?  
1 2      3           4     5 
 
6. How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed and 
annoyed were you?  
1 2      3           4     5 
 
7. Were you able to concentrate on the other vessels 
during the incident (high) or only the incident vessel 
(low)?  
1 2       3           4      5 
 
8. How complicated was the session?  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. How much mental capacity did you have to spare 
during the incident?  
“Very much” indicates that you had a lot of capacity 
left, and so you could easily have done more 
Very low Very high 
Perfect Failure 
Very low Very high 
Very low Very high 
Very high Very low 
Very simple Very complex 
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tasks/more complicated tasks. “Very little” indicates 
that you had very little capacity left and so you would 
have struggled to do any more tasks.   
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
10. How much time did you feel you had to solve the 
incident?  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
11. How helpful was the system at supporting you to 
achieve the task in this scenario?  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. Did you find the information needed to make 
informed choices in this scenario?  
 
Appendix F – SUS questionnaire  
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
   Strongly 
agree 
1. I think that I would like to use this system 
frequently 
     
Ik denk dat ik dit systeem vaak zou willen 
gebruiken 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. I found the system unnecessarily complex 
Ik vond het systeem onnodig complex 
     
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. I thought the system was easy to use      
Very much Very little 
More than enough Not enough 
Very helpful Very unhelpful 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very informative Very uninformative 
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Ik denk dat het systeem makkelijk te gebruiken  
was 1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. I think that I would need the support of a 
technical person to be able to use this system 
     
Ik denk dat ik hulp van een technisch persoon 
nodig zou hebben om dit systeem te gebruiken 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. I found the various functions in this system 
were well integrated 
     
Ik vond dat de verschillende functies van dit 
systeem goed waren geïntegreerd  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. I thought there was too much inconsistency 
in this system 
     
Ik denk dat er teveel inconsistenties in dit 
systeem waren 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. I would imagine that most people would learn 
to use this system very quickly 
     
Ik denk dat de meeste mensen vrij snel zouden 
leren hoe ze dit systeem kunnen gebruiken 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. I found the system very cumbersome to use 
Ik vond het systeem moeizaam was om te  
     
gebruiken 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. I felt very confident using this system 
Ik voelde me zeker in het gebruik van dit  
     
systeem 1 2 3 4 5 
 
10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I 
could get going with this system 
     
Ik moest veel dingen leren voordat ik met dit 
systeem aan de gang kon 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Appendix G – Post-interview questionnaire  
 
Post-experiment interview questions 
1. How complicated did you find it to monitor the vessels? 
2. How complicated did you find it to control the vessels?  
3. How concentrated were you when no incident was happening?  
4. How concentrated were you when an incident was happening? 
5. Did you feel you had enough time to solve the incidents?   
6. Did you find the scenarios realistic? Why/why not? 
7. If you could add one feature to the interface, what would it be, and why? 
8. What information did you find particularly useful? 
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9. Was any of the information provided not useful? 
10. Was there any information you wish you did have, which was not provided?  
11. Would live visual feed have been helpful to monitor and control the vessels?  
12. How mentally demanding was the experiment?  
13. How frustrated did you feel during the experiment? 
14. If you could change one feature to the interface, what would it be, and why? 
15. What is a feasible number of ships a SCC operator can monitor and control safely? 
Appendix H – Debriefing  
 
Debriefing  
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study!  The experiment you recently undertook was done in 
order to test the first version of MARINs Shore Control Center interface setup. Based on your feedback, 
the researchers will make recommendations for how this systems should be designed, and which 
information it needs to have, in order to ensure safe monitoring and controlling of autonomous vessels . 
The participants invited for this experiment were: students, current seafarers, Dolphin software 
instructors and VTS personnel. 
For any discomfort you might feel as a result of having participated in this study, or if you have any 
further questions about the research, please contact the researchers at:  
Guido Band – BAND@fsw.leidenuniv.nl - +31 71 5273998 
Lars Berntzen Arholm – L.Berntzen@academy.marin.nl  - +47 920 95 120 
Gerrit van der Want - G.J.v.d.Want@marin.nl - +31 317 47 99 19 
Kind regards, 
Guido Band, Lars Berntzen Arholm and Gerrit van der Want  
Leiden University Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences  
Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden  
 
Appendix I – Tasks  
 
In scenario 1, no incident occurred, and the participant needed only to monitor the vessel(s).  
In scenario 2, an incident occurred in which an approaching traffic vessel violated COLREGS 
rules, passing the autonomous vessel on the wrong side, thus creating a potential collision. The 
operator needed to notice the other ship making an error and take over manual control to steer the 
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autonomous vessel to safety. 56% of collisions at sea are caused by violations of COLREGs 
(Ramos et al., 2019).  
In scenario 3, a fishing vessel suddenly appears close to one of the autonomous vessels, as it 
suddenly turns on its AIS system. The operator needed to notice the vessel suddenly having 
appeared, take manual control and steer the ship to safety. This incident was chosen as it is a 
realistic occurrence, confirmed by the MARINs internal Traffic & Safety team. Furthermore, it 
exposes one of the weaknesses of not having crew onboard, namely the high reliance on the ship’s 
sensors, and what happens when they are unable to give a full picture of the traffic situation.  
In scenario 4, one of the autonomous ships starts deviating of course. By checking the vessel status 
display, the status display for autonomous vessel 1had changed to red. The solution to this was to 
call the “engineer” for him to “fix” the rudder. This incident was chosen partly because technical 
problem is another large source of debate around the feasibility for long haul autonomous shipping 
(reference), but more importantly it tests the operator’s attention to the non-traditional display 
specific to SCC. The operator’s ability to efficiently monitor these will likely be crucial in the 
absence of “ship sense”, as this display will inform of any status changes in any of the internal 
systems.  
Enhancing operator situational awareness through enhanced design of Shore Control Centre interface 
46 
 
Appendix J – Screenshots marinetraffic.com  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix K – Full interface setup  
 
 
 
 
